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Europol’s international cooperation 
between ‘past present’ and ‘present 
future’: reshaping the external 
dimension of EU police cooperation
Dr Florin Coman-Kund*
1. Introduction
EU agencies1 are interacting in various ways with actors outside the EU 
and they are becoming arguably more and more visible on the interna-
tional arena. Increasingly reflected in their own legal framework and 
practice,2 the international dimension of EU agencies entails, among 
other things,3 providing assistance and support to the Commission, the 
Council and the Member States with regard to aspects of various EU 
external actions and initiatives, as well as establishing more or less auton-
omously formal and informal relations with international organizations 
* Assistant Professor in European Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. 
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. All 
websites accessed 31 December 2017.
1 This article is based on the author’s PhD dissertation: Florin Coman-Kund, European 
Union Agencies as Global Actors: A Legal Study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex 
and Europol (PhD dissertation, Universitaire Pers Maastricht 2015). A revised version of 
this study will be published as a monograph as follows: Florin Coman-Kund ‘European 
Union Agencies as Global Actors: A Legal Study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, 
Frontex and Europol’ (Routledge 2018, forthcoming). For the purpose of this paper, the 
category of EU agencies covers what the Common Approach on EU agencies designates 
as ‘decentralized agencies’ encompassing both the ‘regulatory’ or former ‘Community’ 
agencies and the former ‘third pillar’ agencies – see Joint Statement of the European 
Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on decentralized agencies 
of 19 July 2012 (referred to hereafter as the ‘Common Approach on EU agencies’) ˂ <http://
europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/overhaul/index_en.htm>.
2 Andrea Ott, ‘EU Regulatory Agencies in EU External Relations: Trapped in a Legal 
Minefield between European and International Law’ (2008) 13 EFAR 515, 518.
3 See Florin Coman-Kund, ‘Assessing the Role of EU Agencies in the Enlargement Process: 
the Case of the European Aviation Safety Agency’ (2012) 8 CYELP 335, 339–40.
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and third countries. The development of this dimension of EU agencies’ 
profiles can be explained by the progressive extension of the globaliza-
tion phenomenon leading to an amplification of trans-boundary issues 
and triggering a focus on external aspects in various EU policy fields.4 
In these circumstances, engaging in international cooperation activities 
has arguably become a ‘must’ for the EU agencies in order to enhance 
their effectiveness.5 The need for EU agencies to boost their autonomy 
and legitimacy has also been advanced as a reason for the proliferation 
of international cooperation activities by these bodies.6
Recently, scholars have begun to pay more attention to various 
aspects of EU agencies’ international dimension. Existing studies range 
from exploring the forms and consequences of interactions between 
EU agencies and international institutions,7 to more horizontal studies 
mapping out the external relations of these bodies and pointing to legal 
problems and tensions this may cause,8 or addressing the legal status 
of EU agencies on the international plane,9 to studies covering various 
facets of the international dimension of specific EU agencies.10
From a legal perspective, EU agencies’ evolving international 
dimension poses complex problems regarding the legal nature of their 
 4 See also Martijn Groenleer and Simone Gabbi, ‘Regulatory Agencies of the European 
Union as International Actors: Legal Framework, Development over Time and Strategic 
Motives in the Case of the European Food Safety Authority’ (2013) 4 EJRR 479, 481–2.
 5 Martijn Groenleer, ‘Linking up Levels of Governance: Agencies of the European 
Union and their Interaction with International Organisations’ in Oriol Costa and Knud 
Erik Jørgensen (eds), The Influence of International Institutions on the European Union 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 144.
 6 Groenleer and Gabbi (n 4) 482–3.
 7 Groenleer (n 5) 135–54.
 8 Ott (n 2); Andrea Ott, Ellen Vos and Florin Coman-Kund, ‘EU Agencies on the Global 
Scene: EU and International Law Perspectives’ in Michelle Everson, Cosimo Monda and 
Ellen Vos (eds), European Agencies in-between Institutions and Member States (Kluwer Law 
International 2014) 87–122.
 9 Gregor Schusterschitz, ‘European Agencies as Subjects of International Law’ (2004) 1 
IOLR 1 (2004) 163.
10 See, for instance, Conny Rijken, ‘Legal and Technical Aspects of Co-operation 
between Europol, Third States, and Interpol’ in Vincent Kronenberger (ed), The European 
Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (Asser Press 2001) 
577–603; Dick Heimans, ‘The External Relations of Europol – Political, Legal and 
Operational Considerations’ in Berndt Martenczuk and Servaas van Thiel (eds), Justice, 
Liberty and Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations (VUBPRESS 2008) 367–89; 
Laura Surano, ‘L’Action Extérieure d’Eurojust’ in Marianne Dony (ed), La Dimension Externe 
de l’Espace de Liberté, Sécurité et de Justice au Lendemain de Lisbonne et de Stockholm: un 
Bilan à mi-Parcours (Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2012) 211–19; Melanie Fink, 
‘Frontex Working Arrangements: Legitimacy and Human Rights Concerns regarding 
Technical Relationships’ (2012) 28 Utrecht J Int’l & Eur L 20; Coman-Kund (n 3) on the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); Groenleer and Gabbi (n 4) on the European 
Food Safety Authority (EFSA); Juan Santos Vara, ‘The External Activities of AFSJ Agencies: 
the Weakness of Democratic and Judicial Controls’ (2015) 20 EFAR 115.
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activities, their status as global actors and the scope and limits of their 
international cooperation. First, the international dimension of the 
European agencies raises important legal questions in terms of insti-
tutional balance and the Meroni doctrine of delegation of powers, as 
well as with regard to the distribution of competences and tasks in the 
field of EU external relations. In this respect it is important to clarify 
how far and under which conditions EU agencies are allowed to pursue 
international cooperation under the EU constitutional framework, and 
how the international dimension of EU agencies links to the roles of 
the main EU external action actors. Second, the external actions of EU 
agencies also trigger effects from an international law perspective. This 
requires examining European agencies through the lens of international 
law in order to clarify the legal nature and implications of their actions, 
in particular their treaty-like cooperation instruments concluded with 
third countries and international organizations. Addressing these issues 
is of utmost importance as this may lead to a reappraisal of the position 
of agencies within the EU constitutional framework, revealing clashes 
between EU and international law, and enhancing scrutiny and account-
ability of EU agencies’ international activities. Whilst legal scholarship 
has dealt with these aspects in a sparing and fragmented manner, 
recently a more comprehensive legal–analytical framework featuring 
EU and international law parameters has been proposed to tackle 
them.11 This article builds upon this legal–analytical framework in 
examining the above-mentioned legal aspects with regard to Europol’s 
international dimension.
Europol is the embodiment of an agency with a strong interna-
tional profile, being one of the few EU agencies whose international 
cooperation record consists of formal ‘agreements’ concluded with 
third countries and international organizations.12 As such, Europol 
could be seen as an ‘exemplary’ case for the outer limits of EU agencies’ 
international cooperation powers. At the same time, Europol is a rather 
peculiar EU agency, acting within a specific legal–policy environment13 
and having the ‘pedigree’ of an intergovernmental body established 
11 Coman-Kund (n 1) 85–176; see also Florin Coman-Kund, ‘The International Dimension 
of the EU Agencies: Framing a Growing Legal–Institutional Phenomenon’ (2018) 23 
EFAR 97.
12 Usually, EU agencies’ legal framework and practice features international cooperation 
instruments labelled ‘arrangements’ or ‘memoranda of understanding’.
13 Police cooperation for the purpose of preventing and combatting crime is a particularly 
sensitive operational field in which Member States displayed reluctance over time towards 
more ‘communitarization’, and in which cooperation with national police and enforcement 
authorities is essential.
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by the Member States via a convention.14 This ‘intergovernmental 
pedigree’ had also been reflected in the legal framework based on 
Council Decision 2009/371/JHA (Europol Council Decision)15 as 
regards the agency’s international cooperation. The new Europol 
Regulation,16 applicable as of 1 May 2017, redesigns the agency’s 
international cooperation framework arguably in order to fully align 
it with the post-Lisbon constitutional framework and the Common 
Approach on EU agencies. One important change concerns Europol’s 
international cooperation instruments, in that the agency will conclude 
in the future working and administrative arrangements instead of 
cooperation agreements as provided by the former Europol Council 
Decision. However, the new Europol Regulation ensures partly the 
‘survival’ of the agency’s legal framework based on the Europol Council 
Decision17 and, importantly, it also preserves the validity of Europol’s 
cooperation agreements concluded before 1 May 2017.18
Against this background the aim of this article is two-fold. 
First, to provide an assessment of Europol’s international dimension 
based on its former legal framework and its international cooperation 
practice.19 This is motivated not only by the fact that Europol’s inter-
national cooperation instruments under the former legal framework 
remain valid bases for cooperation, but also by the fact that the new 
Europol Regulation amends the agency’s international dimension in 
response to perceived legal problems and shortcomings rooted in 
the Europol Council Decision. Second, it gives a fresh appraisal of 
Europol’s redesigned international dimension based on the new Europol 
Regulation with a view to mapping prospectively its legal effects and 
potential problems regarding Europol’s operation as a global actor, and 
15 Council Decision 2009/371/JHA of 6 April 2009 establishing the European Police 
Office (Europol) [2009] OJ L 131/37.
16 Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2016 on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and 
replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 2009/935/
JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L 135/53.
17 According to Article 76 of Regulation (EU) 2016/794, ‘rules and measures adopted 
by the Management Board on the basis of Decision 2009/371/JHA shall remain in force 
after 1 May 2017, unless otherwise decided by the Management Board in the application 
of this Regulation’.
18 Article 71(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794.
19 Some aspects of the analysis of Europol’s international cooperation practice draw on 
two semi-structured interviews conducted with Europol officials involved in international 
cooperation aspects of the agency.
14 Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union of 27 November 
1995, on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) [1995] OJ 
C 316/1.
 reshaping the external dimension of eU police cooperation  5
to assess the way in which it addresses crucial aspects of the agency’s 
international cooperation compared to the ‘moribund’ Europol legal 
framework. In this respect, the article addresses the more general 
question of the room left under the Founding Treaties for EU agencies 
like Europol to carry out international cooperation. The legal–analytical 
blueprint employed for this purpose uses the principle of institutional 
balance, the Meroni doctrine and the concept of (binding) ‘international 
agreement’ as parameters for determining the legal nature and impli-
cations of Europol’s international cooperation instruments, as well as 
the compatibility with the EU constitutional framework of the agency’s 
international dimension under the former Europol Council Decision and 
the new Europol Regulation.
In order to address these legal questions in a dynamic and 
comparative fashion, the analysis focuses on essential formal legal 
design aspects of Europol’s old and new international dimensions. 
The paper investigates specifically the way in which the international 
cooperation mandate of Europol is defined, the agency’s international 
cooperation tasks and powers, substantive and procedural aspects 
regarding the agency’s formal international cooperation instruments, 
as well as limitations, supervision and controls over the agency’s inter-
national cooperation activities. Special attention is given to Europol’s 
cooperation agreements as they represent arguably one of the most 
problematic aspects as to the compatibility of the agency’s interna-
tional dimension with the EU constitutional framework concerning 
external relations.20 Europol’s international cooperation practice, which 
is relevant for gaining a deeper understanding into how the agency’s 
international dimension actually works and for determining the legal 
nature of Europol’s concrete international cooperation instruments, 
is examined only with regard to the former legal framework as at the 
moment of writing there was no practice under the new Regulation yet.
The possibility to apply mutatis mutandis findings concerning 
a special agency like Europol to the wider population of EU agencies 
should be regarded with caution. Yet the study of Europol on the basis 
of the above legal–analytical framework mentioned previously may 
offer valuable insights with regard to broader issues, such as the nature, 
scope and limits of the external powers that may be conferred on EU 
agencies, the conditions for the exercise of such powers, the application 
20 The Common Approach on EU agencies (para 25) foresees the conclusion by EU 
agencies of arrangements with third countries and international organizations excluding 
the possibility to commit the EU to international obligations.
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of the principle of institutional balance, and the assessment of EU 
agencies’ international cooperation practices and instruments. Also the 
transformation of Europol’s international dimension through the new 
Europol Regulation might indicate a broader trend towards stream-
lining EU agencies’ international cooperation, entailing that some of 
the elements introduced by the agency’s new legal framework might be 
transplanted to other EU agencies in the future.
The article begins with a brief overview of the evolution and design 
of the agency’s general mandate (section 2). Thereafter, Europol’s 
international dimension according to the Europol Council Decision 
is scrutinized, by addressing both the formal legal framework for 
the agency’s international cooperation and its international practice. 
Besides examining the international cooperation mandate and tasks of 
the agency, the terminology and types, content and structure, effects 
and practical aspects concerning the procedure for the negotiation 
and conclusion of Europol’s cooperation agreements are addressed 
(section 3). This is followed by a mapping out of the design, the 
legal implications and potential problems of Europol’s international 
dimension according to the new Europol Regulation (section 4). 
Next, the article advances a legal–analytical blueprint providing the 
benchmarks for assessing Europol’s international dimension both under 
the old and the new legal frameworks (section 5). Section 6 offers an 
assessment of Europol’s international dimension with regard to the 
legal nature and effects of its international cooperation instruments, 
and as to the compatibility of its international cooperation with the 
European Union’s legal–institutional framework.
2. Europol’s legal design and incremental evolution: 
from a Member States’ agency to an EU agency
Europol was established on the basis of Article K.1 TEU by the 1995 
Europol Convention21 and became operational on 1 July 1999. This 
prompted the conclusion that Europol was not really an EU agency 
but a ‘fully fledged international organization’ equipped with ‘full legal 
personality, including the capacity to enter into binding agreements 
under international law’22 or at least a ‘European organization sui 
21 The Europol Convention can be best described as an intergovernmental agreement 
concluded by the Member States within the framework of the EU; see Rijken (n 10) 582–3.
22 Heimans (n 10) 369.
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generis of the EU’.23 The centre of gravity of Europol’s mandate was on 
information processing and exchange tasks.24
After ten years of operation as an intergovernmental body, 
Europol’s legal framework has been replaced by Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA (Europol Council Decision). This was an important 
milestone in the evolution of Europol with implications for 
its legal status and operation. Most notably, although it kept its 
legal personality, Europol was transformed into an EU agency, meaning 
that it was financed from the EU budget and subject to staff regulations 
and all relevant EU rules.25 However, with regard to the agency’s 
main tasks, its governance and control, the Europol Council Decision 
implemented overall cosmetic changes.26 The same holds for the inter-
national dimension of Europol. The Europol Council Decision, together 
with the relevant implementing measures,27 basically maintained 
the status quo of the Europol Convention, including the agency’s 
capacity to conclude agreements with third countries and international 
organizations.28
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the fields from the 
former ‘third pillar’ were brought together with the other elements of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) within Title V of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Accordingly, police 
cooperation became a shared competence,29 triggering the application 
of the standard EU instruments and decision-making procedures. In this 
vein, Article 88 TFEU (Europol’s treaty legal basis) ensures that the legal 
framework of the agency would be established by regulations adopted 
according to the ordinary legislative procedure. Whereas Protocol No. 
36 on Transitional Provisions still allowed Europol to operate under the 
Europol Council Decision,30 the Lisbon Treaty has further consolidated 
25 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP 2011) 932.
26 Alexandra de Moor and Gert Vermeulen, ‘The Europol Council Decision: Transforming 
Europol into an Agency of the European Union’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1089, 1097–1104 and 
1120–1.
27 Council Decision 2009/934/JHA of 30 November 2009 adopting the implementing 
rules governing Europol’s relations with partners, including the exchange of personal data 
and classified information [2009] OJ L325/6, and Council Decision 2009/935/JHA of 30 
November 2009 determining the list of third states and organizations with which Europol 
shall conclude agreements, [2009] OJ L325/12.
28 Moor and Vermeulen (n 26) 1121.
29 Article 4(2)(j) TFEU.
30 According to Article 9 of Protocol No. 36, the legal effects of acts adopted on the basis 
of the EU Treaty before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon are preserved ‘until those 
acts are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the Treaties’.
23 Rijken (n 10) 583.
24 Heimans (n 10) 369–70.
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the international legal status of the EU, by providing explicitly for the 
European Union’s legal personality,31 by codifying its competence to 
conclude international agreements32 and, arguably, by establishing a 
‘single treaty-making procedure’ under Article 218 TFEU.33
Both the Europol Council Decision34 and Article 88(1) TFEU 
emphasize the role of Europol as a supportive structure for the 
enforcement authorities of the Member States, and not as a ‘European 
FBI’ with fully fledged investigative and enforcement powers. Above all, 
Europol’s information-related tasks defined the ‘core business’ of the 
agency.35
The new Europol Regulation maintains the core principles upon 
which the role and functioning of Europol were premised, but also 
brings some noteworthy novelties. First, it expands Europol’s ratione 
materiae competence by supplementing the list of serious crimes,36 and 
by adding ‘forms of crime which affect a common interest covered by a 
Union policy’.37 Second, it further consolidates Europol’s core informa-
tion-related tasks by establishing an obligation for the Member States 
to provide information to the agency.38 Third, it aims to strengthen 
through the involvement of the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) the supervision over Europol’s processing of personal data,39 
and to increase parliamentary supervision over Europol’s activities in 
line with Article 88(2) TFEU.40 Fourth, the Commission is given a more 
influential role with regard to the agency.41 Overall, the new Regulation 
can be seen as an important step towards transforming Europol from a 
‘special’ agency into an ‘ordinary’ EU agency in line with the Common 
Approach on EU agencies.
32 Articles 3(2) and 216–17 TFEU.
33 See Jean-Claude Piris, The Lisbon Treaty: a Legal and Political Analysis (CUP 2010) 
259–60.
34 Article 3.
35 Moor and Vermeulen (n 26) 1099.
36 For example, as compared to the Europol Council Decision, Annex I of Regulation 
2016/794 adds the category ‘genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ to 
Europol’s mandate.
37 Article 3(1) of Regulation 2016/794; an example is the category of ‘crimes against the 
financial interests of the Union’ listed in Annex I of the Regulation.
38 Recital (13) and Article 7(6) of Regulation 2016/794.
39 Recitals (50)–(54) and Article 43 of Regulation 2016/794.
40 Recital (58) and Articles 51–52 of Regulation 2016/794.
41 See, for instance, Articles 12 and 68 of Regulation 2016/794.
31 Article 47 TEU.
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3. Europol’s international cooperation legal framework 
and practice under Council Decision 2009/371/JHA42
3.1 legal framework
3.1.1  Mandate, tasks and instruments
The legal framework for Europol’s international cooperation activities 
was provided primarily by Article 23 of the Europol Council Decision 
complemented by Council Decision 2009/934/JHA. Article 23(1) of 
the Europol Council Decision stipulated clearly that Europol’s inter-
national cooperation activities were instrumental to the core mandate 
and tasks of the agency. This provision also made clear that the quasi 
exclusive way for the agency to formalize its relationship with partners 
outside the EU was by concluding cooperation agreements. What is 
more, it exhibited that exchange of information related to crimes within 
Europol’s mandate was the main concern of such instruments.43 Council 
Decision 2009/934/JHA also touched on the issue of information 
exchange between Europol and its external partners,44 and introduced 
a distinction between operational and strategic agreements concluded 
by Europol with its partners, depending on the information which 
could be exchanged under each type of instrument.45 Yet importantly, 
the Europol Council Decision provided two important limitations on 
Europol’s international cooperation. According to Article 23(2) in 
combination with Article 26(1) of Council Decision 2009/371/JHA the 
agency was bound to conclude agreements only with third countries 
and international organizations put on a ‘list’ drawn up by the Council, 
on the proposal of Europol’s Management Board.46 Furthermore, Article 
23(2) subjected each Europol’s agreement to prior approval by the 
Council.
42 See concisely on these issues also Coman-Kund (n 11) 108, 110–12 and 114–15.
43 Article 23(3)–(9) of the Europol Council Decision.
44 See Title III, Articles 8–20 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
45 Article 1(g) and (h) of Council Decision 2009/ 934/JHA.
46 The ‘list’ took the form of Council Decision 2009/935/JHA and initially included 
twenty-five third countries and three organizations. The Council’s ‘list’ was amended in 
May 2014, when four third countries were added (Brazil, Georgia, Mexico, United Arab 
Emirates) – see Article 1 of Council Implementing Decision of 6 May 2014 amending 
Decision 2009/935/JHA as regards the list of third States and organizations with which 
Europol shall conclude agreements, [2014] OJ L138/104.
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3.1.2  The procedure for Europol’s cooperation agreements
According to Articles 5–6 of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA, the 
detailed procedure for negotiating and concluding Europol’s interna-
tional agreements included the following milestones:
• the negotiations with a third country or international organization 
included on the Council’s ‘list’ were carried out by the Executive 
Director, supported by the relevant internal units of Europol;47
• after the conclusion of negotiations, the Executive Director had 
to submit the draft agreement to the Management Board for 
endorsement;48
• the draft agreement endorsed by the Management Board was then 
submitted to the Council for approval (which made a decision after 
having consulted the Management Board);49
• the agreement was concluded (signed by the Executive Director) 
after the Council’s approval.50
Whereas for strategic agreements the steps mentioned previously 
were sufficient, for operational agreements there were additional 
procedural requirements.51 First, before initiating negotiations, Europol 
had to carry out ‘an assessment of the existence of an adequate level 
of data protection ensured by the third party’.52 This assessment 
was forwarded to the Management Board, which sent it to the Joint 
Supervisory Body (JSB) for an opinion.53 After receiving the opinion 
of the JSB, the Management Board decided whether to authorize the 
Executive Director to start negotiations on an operational agreement.54 
Second, after the negotiations, the draft agreement was submitted to 
the Management Board, which asked again for the opinion of the JSB, 
this time on the draft agreement.55
47 Article 6(1) and (2) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
48 Article 6(3) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
49 Article 6(4) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
50 Article 6(4) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA. Post Lisbon, the approval took the 
shape of a Council implementing decision.
51 Emma Disley et al, ‘Evaluation of the Implementation of the Europol Council Decision 
and of Europol’s Activities’ (technical report), RAND Europe (2012) 113.
52 Article 5(4) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
53 Established as an independent body outside the structure of the agency, the JSB was 
Europol’s data protection control authority; see Article 34 of the Europol Council Decision 
and Heimans (n 10) 371.
54 Article 6(1) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
55 Article 6(3) of Council Decision 2009/934/JHA.
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3.2 europol’s international dimension in practice
3.2.1  Setting the international cooperation priorities and actions
Europol’s overall priorities, including in the area of international 
cooperation, are framed in multiannual documents adopted by the 
Management Board56 in the shape of four-year general strategies57 
and specific strategies focusing on external relations issues.58 The 
overall planning of Europol’s priorities concerning international 
cooperation could be depicted as mainly being operationally driven, 
but also subject to policy-political influences.59 First, although driven 
mostly by operational needs, setting the agency’s priorities was tightly 
restricted and controlled by the Council and the Member States via the 
Management Board. Second, the consistency between Europol’s inter-
national cooperation priorities and the European Union’s operational 
and political needs and priorities, including taking into account of 
the sudden changes in the EU external action,60 is guaranteed mainly 
by the Commission61 and through relevant Council committees and 
working parties.62 This suggests a rather limited discretion for Europol 
in conducting international cooperation because of the restrictions set 
by the agency’s legal framework and the constraints imposed by its 
operational and political environment.63
3.2.2  Europol’s cooperation agreements
According to Council Decision 2009/934/JHA, the scope of Europol’s 
strategic agreements was more limited in that they allow for the 
exchange of information, except for personal data, while operational 
agreements included the issues covered by strategic agreements plus 
56 Article 37(9)(a) of the Europol Council Decision.
57 For example, Europol Strategy 2016–2020, (2015) EDOC# 796794v19B, available at 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-strategy-2016-2020>.
58 For example, Europol External Strategy 2010–2014, (2010) EDOC # 434663; Europol 
External Strategy 2017–2020 (2016) EDOC#865852v3.
59 According to a Europol official, ‘the setting of Europol’s international strategy is a 
mix of (politically) predetermined elements and of operationally driven considerations’, 
Interview 5, The Hague, 29 January 2013.
60 Interview 13 with a Europol official, The Hague, 1 July 2013.
61 This is in line with the Common Approach on EU agencies (para 25) providing for 
Commission’s role to oversee EU agencies’ international cooperation.
62 E.g. the Group on External JHA issues (JAIEX), Coordinating Committee in the area 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS), Law Enforcement Working 
Party (LEWP).
63 See Madalina Busuioc, Deirdre Curtin and Martijn Groenleer, ‘Agency Growth between 
Autonomy and Accountability: the European Police Office as a “Living Institution”‘ (2011) 
J Eur Publ Pol 862.
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personal data exchanges. Put simply, the two types of agreements 
provided the ‘toolbox’ allowing Europol to use one instrument or 
another depending on the level of trust in its partners: strategic 
agreements to establish formal cooperation with partners whose data 
protection system or human rights record might be problematic64 and 
operational agreements with close partners.
Europol currently has twenty-six agreements: eighteen operational 
agreements (seventeen with third countries65 and one with Interpol) and 
eight strategic agreements (six with third countries66 and the remaining 
two with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
World Customs Organization (WCO)).67 The wording of both strategic 
and operational agreements features prescriptive ‘shall/will’ clauses. 
Regarding the structure, both strategic and operational agreements 
include a preamble, a main body and usually one or more annexes. The 
provisions of all the cooperation agreements are structured in articles.
The core part of all Europol’s agreements deals mostly with the 
exchange of operational, strategic and technical information relating 
to the areas of crime within Europol’s mandate. Rules on the detailed 
procedure for information exchange (including classified information), 
specific limitations and requirements, as well as confidentiality duties 
are included. Other aspects normally included in the core part of the 
agreements deal with issues such as the exchange of expertise and 
training. Importantly, the agreements provide for the possibility to 
assign liaison officers. The final provisions of the strategic agreements 
usually cover dispute settlement, amendment procedures, entry into 
force, termination of the agreement and the relationship with other 
international cooperation instruments. The entry into force of the 
agreements is usually linked to the date on which the third country 
notifies Europol about the completion of its own internal procedures. 
The agreements stipulate that Europol may consent to amendments only 
after approval by the Council, thereby re-confirming that the agency 
does not act fully independently in its relationship with its partners. 
According to the standard procedure, the termination of the agreements 
requires a written notification and a three-month notification period.
64 Heimans (n 10) 382.
65 Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Colombia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, USA (2002).
66 Brazil, China, Russian Federation, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, USA (2001).
67 A list of cooperation agreements is available at <https://www.europol.europa.eu/
partners-agreements>.
 reshaping the external dimension of eU police cooperation  13
Additionally, the operational agreements include detailed 
provisions on the procedures and obligations of the parties concerning 
the exchange, processing and handling of personal data, including 
conditions and restrictions for the onward transmission of the data 
exchanged with third parties. They also lay down a right for the 
individuals and private entities to have access to personal data 
concerning them that is processed under the agreement, and usually 
comprise elaborated provisions on the liability of the contracting parties 
for damages caused to individuals as a result of errors in the exchange 
and processing of personal data. It should be also noted that few of 
Europol’s operational agreements depart from the standard model 
described above.68 The 2002 Supplemental Agreement with the United 
States deserves special attention for its emphasis on the fact that it does 
not give rise to a right on behalf of any private party to obtain, suppress, 
exclude any evidence or to impede the execution of a request.69 Next, 
quite surprisingly, the agreement does not mention anything about 
the adequate level protection of personal data and says little about 
data protection safeguards. What is more, this agreement does not 
contain clear provisions on liability, and it does not include elaborated 
provisions on dispute settlement.70 These issues raised legal concerns 
as it was suspected that this agreement did not meet essential legal and 
data protection safeguards provided by the Europol legal framework, 
thereby potentially infringing fundamental rights.71
Regarding the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of 
the cooperation agreements, in practice, the initiation of contacts 
with potential partners started after receiving a request, which was 
normally channelled through the Management Board.72 An important 
practical aspect is that both JSB’s (formally non-binding) opinions on 
the data protection report and on the draft agreement to be signed 
between the parties seemed to be quite influential.73 Also, throughout 
the whole process (initiation, negotiations, conclusion) there were 
informal and formal interactions between the agency and the Council, 
68 Operational agreements with Canada and USA.
69 Article 3(3).
70 Articles 11 and 13.
71 Elspeth Guild et al, ‘Implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its 
Impact on EU Home Affairs Agencies: Frontex, Europol and the European Asylum Support 
Office’, Study for the European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs (LIBE) (PE 453.196/2011) 74; see also Heimans (n 10) 385–7.
72 Interview 5 (n 59).
73 Interview 13 (n 60).
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the Commission as well as the Member States.74 This suggests dynamics 
going beyond the formal legal procedures, entailing more involvement 
of the main EU external action actors in Europol’s most important inter-
national cooperation agreements than on paper.
A recent development regarding the procedure for the conclusion 
of Europol’s agreements flowed from Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU)’s judgment in Case C-363/1475 concerning the action for 
annulment of Council Implementing Decision 2014/269/EU extending the 
Council’s ‘list’. The Court confirmed that Article 26(1)(a) of the Europol 
Council Decision represented a valid secondary legal basis76 for adopting 
Council implementing acts such as the one under consideration,77 and 
established a duty for the Council to consult the European Parliament 
(EP) based on former Article 39(1) TEU when adopting such measures.78 
The Council gave an extensive interpretation to this consultation duty by 
extending it to all implementing measures adopted under the old ‘third 
pillar’ framework.79 Accordingly, after September 2015, the Council imple-
menting decisions approving Europol’s agreements with third countries 
were also subject to prior EP consultation. In short, this resulted in 
strengthening EP’s oversight by adding an extra condition to the procedure 
for the negotiation and conclusion of the agency’s cooperation agreements.
4. The new Europol Regulation: redesigning Europol’s 
international dimension
The new Europol Regulation substantively redesigns Europol’s inter-
national dimension.80 Among the factors that arguably triggered the 
overhaul of the agency’s international cooperation were the demand 
for aligning Europol’s international relations with the post-Lisbon 
74 Interviews 5 (n 59) and 13 (n 60).
75 Case C-363/14 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:579. In that case, the EP argued 
essentially that the contested Council implementing decision had been adopted based on 
an invalid secondary law legal basis (ie, Article 26 of the Europol Council Decision), and 
that, moreover, EP’s prerogative to be consulted before the adoption of that decision had 
been breached.
76 See for previous cases on this matter, Joined Cases C-317/13 and C-679/13 Parliament 
v Council EU:C:2015:223, and Case C-540/13 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:224.
77 Case C-363/14 Parliament v. Council, paras 70–72.
78 ibid, paras 82–85.
79 Council doc. 12035/15, Judgment of the Court of 10 September 2015 in Case 
C-363/14, ‘European Parliament v Council for the European Union – legality of a Council 
implementing Decision based on the 2009 Europol Decision concerning the list of third 
states with which Europol can conclude cooperation agreements’, 7 October 2015, 6.
80 For a brief analysis, see also Coman-Kund (n 11).
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EU external action constitutional framework, the concerns regarding 
the insufficient parliamentary/democratic scrutiny over the agency’s 
international activities, and the need to streamline its international 
dimension in line with the Common Approach on EU agencies.81 The 
Commission in particular had been sensitive over time as regards 
Europol’s power to conclude its own international cooperation 
agreements as this could affect the coherence of the Union’s external 
relations and collide with the institutional balance established by 
the Founding Treaties regarding EU external representation and 
treaty-making.82 Post Lisbon, Articles 216 and 218 TFEU offered 
arguably more support for an exclusive EU treaty-making procedure 
which rendered allegedly the possibility for Europol to conclude 
binding international agreements highly questionable.83 Also the EP’s 
frustration regarding its longstanding non-involvement in Europol’s 
design and activities (including highly controversial aspects of the 
agency’s international cooperation, such as the 2002 Supplemental 
Agreement with USA)84 had been arguably one of the drivers behind 
the reform of Europol’s international dimension. As such, the EP had 
been eager to seize the opportunity offered by Article 88 TFEU in order 
to gain the possibility to decide on an equal footing with the Council 
upon Europol’s legal design, operation and scrutiny (including inter-
national exchanges of data).85 As stated in the Commission’s proposal 
for the Europol Regulation,86 the Common Approach on EU agencies, 
which foresees an enhanced relationship between the Commission and 
EU agencies for consistency reasons and for ensuring that these bodies 
do not commit the Union to international obligations, also played a 
role in the reshaping of Europol’s international dimension.87
81 ‘Impact Assessment on Adapting the European Police Office’s Legal Framework with 
the Lisbon Treaty’ SWD (2013) 98 final, 3–4.
82 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the European Police Office 
(Europol)’ COM (2006) 817 final, 11; Commission, ‘Impact Assessment on Adapting the 
European Police Office’s Legal Framework with the Lisbon Treaty’ SWD (2013) 98 final, 3. 
See also Heimans (n 10) 389; Moor and Vermeulen (n 26) 1107–8.
83 See House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, Reforming Europol 3rd Report 
of Session 2013–2014 (TSO 2013), HC 83-iii (Session 2013/14), 13.
84 Busuioc, Curtin and Groenleer (n 63) 857–8. On the legal concerns raised by this 
agreement, see Guild et al (n 71) 74.
85 EP legislative resolution of 17 January 2008 on the proposal for a Council decision 
establishing the European Police Office (EUROPOL), P6_TA (2008)0015; Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Meeting 4-5 November 2009, Joint debate on 
Europol related files, LIBE(2009)1104_1; see also Moor and Vermeulen (n 26) 1096–1097.
86 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation and Training (Europol) 
and repealing Decisions 2009/371/JHA and 2005/681/JHA’ COM (2013) 173 final, 4.
87 See in particular para 25 of the Common Approach (n 1).
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First, Europol is brought in line with other EU agencies, in that the 
agency will formally establish cooperative relations with the competent 
authorities of third countries (instead of third countries as provided by 
the former Europol legal framework).88
Second, in response to the concerns regarding institutional balance 
in EU external relations and the unity of the Union’s external repre-
sentation, there will no longer be Europol cooperation agreements. 
Whilst Europol’s agreements concluded by 1 May 2017 are preserved89 
and will remain for the time being the basis for cooperation with 
third countries and international organizations,90 future international 
agreements allowing the agency to transfer personal data will be 
concluded according to Article 218 TFEU.91
However, the Europol Regulation does not clarify whether and 
how the agency will be involved in the negotiation of the relevant 
agreements foreseen under Article 218 TFEU. Article 11(2) of the 
Europol Regulation only provides for the possibility of the Management 
Board to make a suggestion to the Council to draw the attention of the 
Commission to the need for concluding an ‘Article 218 TFEU’ inter-
national agreement. From this provision it can be inferred that the 
initialling of an international agreement allowing Europol to exchange 
personal data will not so much depend on the agency anymore, but 
on the Council and the Commission. Furthermore, the application of 
the procedure for ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements will entail Council 
decisions concerning the opening of negotiations, adopting negotiating 
directives, authorizing the signing of and concluding the agreement, 
negotiations by the negotiator designated by the Council, and EP’s 
consent.92 Within this procedure, Europol representatives might 
eventually be involved either in the negotiating team or in the special 
consultation committee which may be designated by the Council 
in order to support the negotiator.93 In any case, this represents an 
important shift in Europol’s role in international cooperation, as 
compared to the Europol Council Decision, where the agency was in 
the lead as regards the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of the 
cooperation agreements. This change largely reflects Commission’s 
88 Article 23(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
89 According to Article 25(4) of Regulation 2016/794, the Commission will review all 
Europol’s cooperation agreements by 14 June 2021, in particular with regard to data 
protection.
90 Europol External Strategy 2017–2020 (2016) EDOC#865852v3, 4.
91 Article 25(1) and (4) of Regulation 2016/794.
92 Article 218 (6)(a) TFEU juncto Article 88(2) TFEU.
93 Article 218(4) TFEU.
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view regarding the revision of Europol’s international cooperation with 
a view to fully align it with the Lisbon Treaty and to increase coherence 
in the Union’s external relations.94 With regard to the latter aspect, the 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements concerning 
Europol by the main EU external action actors are expected to ensure 
better that broader strategic aspects of the Union’s external relations 
are observed in the agency’s international cooperation activities.
Furthermore, it remains to be seen how effective the procedure 
laid down in Article 218 TFEU will be. Thus, political and non- 
specialized actors might not be sufficiently familiar with the specific 
and highly technical issues covered by the current Europol agreements. 
What is more, there might be a risk for wider political preferences in 
the Union’s external action area being privileged to the detriment of 
Europol’s operational priorities. Also the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements under Article 218 TFEU might take longer than in the case 
of Europol’s cooperation agreements.
Besides, it is not very clear what kind of agreements will be 
concluded under Article 218 TFEU. One option would be to conclude 
special agreements concerning Europol’s cooperation with a third 
country or international organization, in particular with regard to 
exchanges of personal data. Such instruments would be very much like 
the current Europol’s cooperation agreements. Another option could 
be the conclusion of broader framework agreements between the EU 
and the respective international partner covering various cooperation 
aspects, and including Europol. Under the latter scenario, the negotiation 
process might meet with specific difficulties depending on the breadth 
and complexity of the issues covered by such an agreement.
Third, Europol is still allowed to conclude specific international 
cooperation instruments. In this respect, the Europol Regulation distin-
guishes between working arrangements and administrative arrange-
ments in a way that evokes the demarcation between strategic and 
operational agreements under the old legal framework. The working 
arrangements are designed to cover cooperative relations, except for 
exchanges of personal data, and are explicitly characterized as not 
being binding for the EU and the Member States.95 Europol’s adminis-
trative arrangements are intended to enable personal data exchanges by 
implementing ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements, cooperation agreements 
concluded by Europol before 1 May 2017, or the Commission’s 
94 See Moor and Vermeulen (n 26) 1107–8.
95 Article 23(4) of Regulation 2016/794.
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‘adequacy decisions’ regarding the transfer of personal data, but, 
unlike the working arrangements, nothing is mentioned about their 
legal nature.96 While on the face of it, the provisions of the new 
Regulation suggest that such instruments would likely qualify as soft 
law measures97 (as shown in section 5), determining their legal nature 
requires a case-by-case analysis of each particular instrument in light of 
international law criteria.
It should be also noted that, unlike the Europol Council Decision, 
the new Regulation does not provide details regarding the procedure 
for the negotiation and conclusion of Europol’s working and admin-
istrative arrangements, except that they need to be approved by 
the Management Board.98 As compared to Europol’s cooperation 
agreements, the new international cooperation framework does not 
foresee Council’s approval or EP’s compulsory consultation for the 
agency’s new international cooperation tools.
Fourth, the new Regulation enhances the Commission’s role 
with regard to Europol’s international dimension. Most obviously, this 
is exhibited by formalizing the Commission’s ‘adequacy decisions’99 
as one of the legal bases, allowing the agency to exchange personal 
data. As already mentioned, the implementation of such decisions 
may require the conclusion of specific administrative arrangements 
between the agency and competent authorities of third countries and 
international organizations100 moreover, Europol’s Executive Director 
has a duty to report to the Management Board on the implementa-
tion of the Commission’s ‘adequacy decisions’.101 Additionally, Article 
25(4) of the new Regulation further bolsters the Commission’s position 
by granting it the power to review Europol’s ‘surviving’ cooperation 
agreements with a view to maintain or replace them with ‘Article 218’ 
agreements. In line with the Common Approach on EU Agencies,102 
 96 Article 25(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
 97 For a recent analysis of the concept of ‘soft law’ and of soft law instruments at EU 
level, see Fabien Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union: the Changing Nature of EU Law’ 
(2015) 21 Eur LJ (2015) 68.
 98 Article 11(1)(r) of Regulation 2016/794.
 99 Based on Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/
JHA, [2016] OJ L 119/89.
100 Article 25(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
101 Article 25(2) of Regulation 2016/794.
102 See in particular paras 29 and 60 of the Common Approach on EU agencies (n 1).
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the new Regulation also introduced more general tools, which enable 
presumably the Commission to influence the agency’s international 
cooperation. This entails giving the Commission a say with regard to 
Europol’s multiannual planning and annual work programmes,103 as 
well as presumably the role assigned to the Commission as regards the 
periodic evaluation of the agency.104
Fifth, the new Regulation formally enhances parliamentary scrutiny 
of Europol’s international cooperation as compared to the former 
Europol Council Decision. A Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (JPSG), 
which brings together members of the EP and of national parliaments, 
is established with a view to monitor Europol’s activities.105 For this 
purpose, the Europol Regulation imposes a duty on the chair of the 
Management Board, the Executive Director and other Europol officials 
to report before the JPSG on the agency’s activities.106 Moreover, an 
obligation is placed on Europol to transmit to JPSG various documents, 
including the administrative arrangements concluded with authorities 
of third countries and international organizations, for the purpose of 
enabling exchanges of personal data.107 The outcome of the monitoring 
carried out by the JPSG materializes in ‘conclusions’, which are submitted 
to the EP and the national parliaments.108 Additionally, the EP can access 
non-classified and, under certain conditions, also classified information 
processed by or through Europol.109 Nevertheless, two caveats should be 
mentioned both as regards JPSG monitoring and EP’s access to Europol 
information. To begin with, access to information will be subject to the 
agency’s own rules regarding protection of non-classified and classified 
information, which could at least in theory enable Europol to restrict 
to a certain extent parliamentary scrutiny of its activities.110 Next, the 
Europol Regulation does not provide anything concrete regarding the 
legal consequences of the scrutiny of Europol’s activities.
Sixth, the supervision of Europol’s processing of personal data 
is reinforced by replacing the JSB with the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) with far-reaching tasks and powers.111 In this 
respect, the EDPS is tasked to hear complaints, conduct inquiries, 
103 Article 12(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
104 Article 68 of Regulation 2016/794.
105 Article 51(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
106 Article 51(2) of Regulation 2016/794.
107 Article 51(3)–(4) of Regulation 2016/794.
108 Article 51(5) of Regulation 2016/794.
109 Article 52 of Regulation 2016/794.
110 See Articles 51(4) and 52(1)–(2) juncto Article 67 of Regulation 2016/794.
111 See Article 43 of Regulation 2016/794.
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monitor and ensure the application of the relevant EU legal framework 
in order to protect natural persons with regard to processing of personal 
data by Europol, including in the context of international exchanges of 
data.112 The EDPS may, inter alia, warn or admonish Europol, compel 
the agency to rectify, restrict, erase or destroy incorrectly processed 
personal data, ban Europol’s processing operations, or refer a matter to 
the EP, the Council, the Commission or the CJEU.113
112 Article 43(2) of Regulation 2016/794.
113 Article 43(3) of Regulation 2016/794.
Table 1. Comparative overview of Europol’s international dimension under 
the Europol Council Decision and the new Europol Regulation
Europol’s 
International 
Dimension Europol Council Decision New Europol Regulation
Mandate 
definition
Instrumental – ancillary 
to core tasks
Instrumental – ancillary to 
core tasks
Tasks Information exchange 
(strategic and personal 
data)
Information exchange 
(strategic and personal data)
Formal 
cooperation 
instruments
Cooperation agreements 
(strategic and 
operational)
Working arrangements (non-
personal data) and (imple-
menting) administrative 
arrangements (personal data)
Procedures Elaborate: 
Council’s ‘list’, 
Management Board 
authorization to 
start negotiations, 
JSB opinions (for 
operational agreements), 
Management Board 
endorsement of draft 
agreement, Council 
approval
Concise: 
Management Board to decide 
upon the conclusion of 
working and administrative 
arrangements
Supervision 
and controls
Council, Management 
Board, JSB, Commission 
(informally), EP (ex post 
information duties)
Management Board, EDPS, 
Commission (formal role), 
EP/JPSG (more intense ex 
post formal reporting and 
information duties)
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5. A legal–analytical framework for assessing Europol’s 
international dimension114
From an EU law perspective, the principle of institutional balance and 
the so-called Meroni doctrine, as essential parameters for determining 
the ‘constitutionality’ of the overall design and powers of EU agencies 
like Europol, bear particular importance also for assessing Europol’s 
international cooperation mandate, powers and actions. As for the 
international law perspective, the concept of ‘international agreement’ 
enables the clarification of the legal nature of Europol’s international 
cooperation instruments.
5.1 the principle of institutional balance and the doctrine 
of delegation of powers
Developed gradually in CJEU’s case law115 and enshrined in Article 
13(2) TEU, the principle of institutional balance has been portrayed 
by scholars as a tool performing a similar function at EU level to the 
principle of separation of powers in state constitutional systems.116 
Thus, institutional balance is aimed at a system of checks and balances 
in which the prerogatives of the EU institutions are guaranteed.117 
Based on this understanding, institutional balance requires ‘that each 
institution: (1) has the necessary independence in exercising its powers; 
(2) must respect the powers of the other institutions; and (3) may not 
unconditionally assign its powers to other institutions and bodies’.118 In 
114 Based on the legal–analytical framework for assessing the international dimension 
of EU agencies developed in Coman-Kund (n 1), and further refined in Coman-Kund (n 
11) 100–106.
115 Some of the landmark cases affirming the principle of institutional balance are 
Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community EU:C:1958:7 and Case 10/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, 
società in accomandita semplice v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community 
EU:C:1958:8 (the Meroni cases); Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel v Köster and Berodt & Co EU:C:1970:115; Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council: 
Radioactive contamination of foodstuffs (Chernobyl) EU:C:1991:373.
116 Sacha Prechal, ‘Institutional Balance: a Fragile Principle with Uncertain Contents’ in 
Ton Heukel, Niels Blokker and Marcel Brus (eds) The European Union after Amsterdam: a 
Legal Analysis (Kluwer Law International 1998) 280; Jean-Paul Jacqué, ‘The Principle of 
Institutional Balance’ (2004) 41 CML Rev 383, 384.
117 Prechal (n 116) 280.
118 The list of ‘institutional balance’ requirements has been advanced initially by Lenaerts 
and Van Nuffel listing, however, requirements (2) and (3) in a reversed order; see Koen 
Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Sweet & Maxwell 
1999) 414. This list has been taken over and adapted by Majone, and adopted in this study 
as in the author’s view the current sequence of requirements reflects more logically the 
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particular the second and the third observations illustrate the relevance 
of the principle of institutional balance concerning the delegation of 
powers to EU agencies like Europol.119 More specifically, when setting 
up and entrusting powers to an EU agency like Europol, it must be 
ensured that its legal design neither affects the powers of the EU institu-
tions established by the Treaties nor entails an unconditional surrender 
of powers by the institutions creating it.
The main tool ensuring that EU agencies like Europol do not 
affect the institutional balance is the delegation of powers doctrine or 
the so-called Meroni doctrine.120 The delegation of powers doctrine 
determines the kind of powers that may be entrusted to EU agencies, as 
well as the conditions and requirements attached to such powers. The 
delegation of powers doctrine is dynamic, depending on the evolution 
of the EU constitutional framework and on the interpretation given by 
the CJEU. In the Meroni cases, the Court established that EU institu-
tions may delegate to external bodies ‘executive’ powers that they 
themselves possess according to the Treaties, but only if such powers 
are ‘clearly defined’ and subject to their supervision.121 In the ESMA 
judgment, the Court confirmed the application of the Meroni doctrine 
to EU agencies,122 but at the same it opened the path for entrusting 
wide-ranging powers to these bodies.123 According to the Meroni logic 
as reinterpreted by the CJEU in ESMA,124 and in light of the principle 
of institutional balance,125 EU agencies’ powers seem to be acceptable 
as long as:
essentials of the principle of institutional balance; see Giandomenico Majone, ‘Delegation 
of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’ (2002) 8 ELJ 319, 327.
119 Coman-Kund (n 1) 350.
120 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Regulating the Regulatory Process: “Delegation of Powers” in the 
European Community’ (1993) 18 EL Rev 23, 27 and 40–49.
121 Case 9/56, Meroni, 152 and Case 10/56, Meroni, 173.
122 Case C-270/2012 United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (ESMA) EU:C:2014:1, 
para 41.
123 ESMA, paras 44–45. See for a detailed analysis of the ESMA judgment, Merijn 
Chamon, ‘The Empowerment of Agencies under the Meroni Doctrine and Article 114 TFEU: 
Comment on United Kingdom v Parliament and Council (Short-selling) and the Proposed 
Single Resolution Mechanism’ (2014) 39 EL Rev 381.
124 There is no general consensus on the detailed list of requirements that make up the 
Meroni doctrine, the only common aspect so far being that ‘discretionary powers cannot 
be delegated’, see Chamon (n 123) 382; for an overview of the various Meroni conditions 
devised in literature, see Merijn Chamon, EU Agencies: Legal and Political Limits to the 
Transformation of the EU Administration (OUP 2016) 191.
125 Regarding the relevance of institutional balance as a standard for assessing the 
lawfulness of EU agencies’ powers, see Stefan Griller and Andreas Orator, ‘Everything 
Under Control? The “Way Forward” for European Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni 
Doctrine’ (2010) 35 EL Rev 3, 31. Whereas, conceptually, the principle of institutional 
balance, being concerned with preserving the prerogatives of the EU institutions, is different 
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(1) they are of an executive nature;126
(2)  they are clearly defined, which, however, has been construed 
broadly by the Court as meaning that they stay within the 
boundaries of the agency’s broad regulatory framework;127
(3)  they there are criteria and conditions limiting the discretion of the 
agency, which calls for mechanisms ensuring sufficient oversight 
by the main EU institutions;128
(4)  they do not encroach upon the powers conferred by the Treaties 
on the EU institutions.129
In the aftermath of ESMA, EU agencies like Europol may arguably 
be entrusted with wide-ranging powers provided that the revamped 
Meroni conditions are met. Moreover, alternative routes for the 
delegation of executive powers by the legislator to agencies, outside 
the Commission’s powers under the Treaties, do not necessarily breach 
the principle of institutional balance. What seems to matter in terms 
of institutional balance in light of the revived Meroni doctrine is the 
system of controlling mechanisms set up under the Treaty framework 
with regard to the exercise of EU agencies’ powers in order to preserve 
the system of checks and balances.
The principle of institutional balance and the Meroni require-
ments are relevant legal standards for assessing the overall design and 
delegated powers of EU agencies like Europol. It is therefore maintained 
that they are also applicable to their international cooperation tasks 
and activities.130 The specific features of the international dimension of 
EU agencies like Europol entail in particular that these bodies must not 
encroach upon the powers conferred by the Treaties on the EU institu-
tions in the Union’s external action area.
from the Meroni doctrine, it is maintained that in practice these two parameters are tightly 
connected. Accordingly, for the purpose of the present analytical framework, conditions 
regarding delegation of powers to EU agencies stricto sensu (1)–(3) have been integrated 
with requirements dictated by the principle of institutional balance (4). To be sure, there 
is no consensus in the literature as regards the precise relationship between institutional 
balance and Meroni; see for a summary of the different views, Chamon (n 123) 188–9 and 
200–1.
126 ESMA, para 67. Here the Court states that the condition that ‘only clearly defined 
executive powers may be delegated’ is still a valid standard for assessing ESMA’s powers.
127 ibid, para 44.
128 ibid, paras 45–54.
129 ibid, paras 84–86.
130 Coman-Kund (n 1) 88–9.
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5.1.1  Institutional balance and delegation of powers in the EU external 
action area
Whereas various actors are involved in different ways in the Union’s 
external action, from Articles 17(1) and 21(3) TEU, as well as Article 
220 TFEU it can be inferred that the Commission is mainly in charge 
of the Union’s external representation and of the daily management 
of its external relations.131 Recently in Case C-660/13,132 the Court 
has further clarified the scope and limits of the Commission’s external 
powers in light of the principle of institutional balance. In its judgment, 
the Court explained that the EU external action is based on an insti-
tutional system whereby the European Council defines the strategic 
interests and objectives of the Union, the Council is in charge of policy-
making, and more specifically it further elaborates the Union’s external 
action and ensures its consistency, whereas the Commission exercises 
executive and management functions and ensures the Union’s external 
representation.133
Next, the institutional balance regarding EU treaty-making is 
relevant for the limits of EU agencies’ international cooperation as it 
triggers the inquiry into whether such actors are allowed to conclude 
international binding agreements. This directly questions the consti-
tutionality of Europol’s cooperation agreements, and also the agency’s 
international cooperation instruments according to the new Europol 
Regulation, provided that these qualify as binding agreements in light of 
the relevant international law criteria. Thus, Article 218 TFEU features 
a procedure according to which the Council formally decides on the 
opening of negotiations, the signing and conclusion of the international 
agreements, while the Commission, in principle, can only propose and 
negotiate the Union’s binding international agreements. On this division 
of tasks, the Court took a strict stance, relying on the principle of institu-
tional balance. The issue arose most famously in Case C-327/91 France v 
Commission134 around the legal question of whether the Commission 
could conclude certain international agreements autonomously. The 
Court disagreed, essentially arguing that there was a particular institu-
tional balance set by the Treaty with regard to the Union’s international 
131 Ott (n 2) 521. See also Commission, Vademecum on the External Action of the 
European Union, SEC (2011) 881/3, 18–19.
132 Case C-660/13 Council v Commission EU:C:2016:616. In casu, the Council asked 
for the annulment of a Commission decision on the signature of an addendum to the 
2006 Memorandum of Understanding on a Swiss contribution to the new Member States 
concluded between the EU and Switzerland.
133 ibid, paras 33–34.
134 Case C-327/91 France v Commission EU:C:1994:305.
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agreements entailing the conclusion of such agreements by the Council, 
not the Commission.135 Furthermore, the Court indicated that there was 
no automatic parallelism between the internal and external powers of 
the Commission as far as the Union’s treaty-making was concerned.136
The strict stance taken by the Court seems to be backed up by 
Article 218(1) TFEU, suggesting a single procedure for the negotiation 
and conclusion of the Union’s agreements with third countries and 
international organizations.137 However, the delegation of specific 
treaty-making powers to the Commission and other actors like EU 
agencies should not be ruled out, provided that the prerogatives of the 
institutions involved in ‘Article 218 TFEU’ procedure are not affected.138
A more flexible view of the institutional balance in external 
relations has also been embraced by the EU legislator, by delegating 
certain external relations tasks to the Commission. The most obvious 
examples are the financing agreements concluded by the Commission 
with third countries and international organizations on the basis of the 
EU Financial Regulation.139 Similarly, the EU legislator has entrusted 
limited external relations tasks to EU agencies, though the Founding 
Treaties do not formally assign them with a role in the Union’s external 
action. The founding acts of some EU agencies provide explicitly 
for the possibility to conclude agreements140 or arrangements with 
third countries and international organizations.141 A common thread 
in all these cases is that the enabled international cooperation is 
ancillary and instrumental to the implementation of the relevant 
secondary legislative instruments. If such secondary law provisions are 
interpreted as allowing legally binding agreements to be concluded 
by the Commission and the EU agencies, one may argue that the EU 
legislator distorted the institutional balance under Article 218 TFEU.
135 ibid, para 36.
136 ibid, para 41. See also James Kingston, ‘External Relations of the European 
Community: External Capacity versus Internal Competence’ (1995) 44 ICLQ 659, 668.
137 Piris (n 33) 87.
138 See on the delegation of treaty-making powers to the Commission and other EU 
institutions and bodies, Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected 
Essays (CUP 2014) 392–9.
139 Articles 58 and 184–9 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to 
the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 
1605/2002 [2012] OJ L 298/1; see also Schütze (n 138) 395–9.
140 Besides the former Europol Council Decision, the label ‘agreement’ is explicitly 
mentioned in the case of Eurojust (Article 26a of 2002/187/JHA Council Decision of 28 
February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, 
[2002] OJ L 63/1).
141 See, for details and examples, Coman-Kund (n 1) 62–80.
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147 ESMA, para 85.
Yet, in our view, a delineation142 could be made between 
agreements concluded according to the ordinary procedure laid down 
in Article 218 TFEU and international agreements concluded by the 
Commission and other EU bodies. The first category embodies the 
most important legal–political commitments taken by the Union on 
the international plane corresponding to a sort of ‘external legislation-
making’, and requiring the participation of the EU institutions that are 
also involved in the legislative process.143 The second category features 
agreements of a technical–administrative nature regarding the imple-
mentation of Article 218 TFEU agreements and EU legislation, and the 
daily management of EU external policies or the external dimension of 
Union’s internal policies.144 These instruments must comply with the 
international agreements concluded in accordance with Article 218 
TFEU and with the Union’s internal legislation, and they must not affect 
the powers bestowed on other actors in EU external relations.
5.1.2  EU agencies and institutional balance in external relations
Whereas the Commission and the EU agencies resemble each other in 
that they both pursue, as part of the EU administration, international 
cooperation on a technical–administrative level, the Founding Treaties 
are silent as regards the role of agencies in the EU external action 
area. However, in ESMA, the Court admitted generally that ‘while the 
treaties do not contain any provision to the effect that powers may be 
conferred on’ EU agencies, such a possibility exists nevertheless.145 
Since there is no distinction between the delegation of powers exercised 
by EU agencies internally, (within the Union), and powers concerning 
external relations, one may assume that the possibility to delegate 
holds in principle for both categories.146 Moreover, the Court clarifies 
that post Lisbon, the Commission’s prerogatives under the Treaties 
should not be undermined per se if executive powers delegated to EU 
agencies are part of the regulatory framework in a policy area that 
requires specific technical expertise, and they are necessary to attain 
the objectives of that policy area.147 Similarly, limited international 
cooperation tasks and actions performed by the EU agencies within 
142 For a similar view, see Schütze (n 138) 392–6.
143 For a parallel between the Union’s international law-making and the making of its 
‘internal’ legislation, see Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP 2011) 193–4.
144 For a more detailed analysis of the concept of ‘international administrative agreement’ 
at EU level, see Coman-Kund (n 1) 155–65.
145 ESMA, para 79.
146 Coman-Kund (n 1) 132.
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their mandate, and with a view to attain the objectives established by 
the EU legislator, should not be in principle irreconcilable with the 
powers of the Commission in EU external relations.
The possibility for EU agencies to pursue international cooperation 
has been acknowledged in the Common Approach on EU agencies148 
through an all-embracing formula covering instances where the 
mandate or work programme of these bodies ‘foresees cooperation 
with third countries and/or international organizations’. Moreover, the 
CJEU has for the first time examined the international dimension of an 
agency with regard specifically to Europol in Case C-363/14, Parliament 
v Council149 without questioning the ‘constitutionality’ of the agency’s 
international dimension as long as it was ancillary and necessary for the 
performance of its core tasks, and provided that it took place within the 
framework defined by the EU legislature.150
Unlike the Commission, which has a general vocation in EU 
external relations, EU agencies may only become involved in interna-
tional cooperation as sectoral actors, with a role that is restricted to 
what is necessary to fulfil their core mandate entrusted by the legislator 
in a certain policy area. Accordingly, entrusting certain international 
cooperation tasks to EU agencies is acceptable, but the Meroni require-
ments listed previously and the institutional balance in the EU external 
action area must be observed.
It is also maintained that EU agencies can be delegated limited 
powers to conclude binding international agreements inherent to 
the fulfilment of their mandate by an act of secondary legislation.151 
Similarly to the Commission’s administrative agreements, such 
agreements concluded by the EU agencies are a special form of EU 
external administrative action which does not automatically disturb the 
institutional balance laid down in Article 218 TFEU.152 In order for 
such instruments to be validated in light of the Meroni requirements 
and the principle of institutional balance, it is essential that they: (1) 
remain within the core mandate of the agency, and are consistent with 
148 Common Approach on EU agencies (n 1), para 25.
149 The Court examined the overall setting of Europol’s international relations, including 
the agency’s cooperation agreements, with a view to determine whether the Council 
decision amending the ‘list’ of Europol’s partners pertained to an essential element of the 
matter regulated by the Europol Council Decision, which would have required using the 
legislative procedure established by primary law instead of the more flexible procedure 
provided for in Article 26(1)(a) of the Europol Council Decision.
150 Case C-363/14 Parliament v Council, paras 49–50.
151 See Schütze (n 138) 397–9.
152 See Ott, Vos and Coman-Kund (n 8) 91–93 and 115–16.
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‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements and EU legislation; and (2) the agency is 
subject to sufficient supervision and control, ensuring that the powers 
of the main actors in the EU external action area are not affected. In 
particular, the Council and the Commission should be involved in view 
of their roles under Articles 17(1), 16(6) and 21(3) TEU, as well as 
Articles 218 and 220 TFEU.
5.2 the concept of a (binding) ‘international agreement’
Moving away from the controversies surrounding the concept of 
‘treaty’ or binding ‘international agreement’,153 the most authoritative 
definition is to be found in the two Vienna Conventions on the Law 
of Treaties.154 These instruments define a treaty as ‘an international 
agreement’ concluded in a written form and governed by interna-
tional law, regardless of whether it is embodied in one, two or more 
instruments and whatever its particular designation.155 This definition 
is widely accepted by the international law scholarship156 and it is also 
supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)157 as reflecting 
customary international law.
Based on this definition, it follows that under international law 
an essential criterion for assessing the legally binding character of 
international instruments is the genuine intention of the parties to 
create binding effects governed by international law, regardless of the 
name or the form of the instrument.158 Accordingly, one may identify 
two essential requirements for an instrument (agreement) to become 
binding under international law:
153 See, for a comprehensive overview, Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International 
Law (Kluwer 1996).
154 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States (the 1969 Vienna 
Convention) and 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations (the 1986 Vienna 
Convention).
155 Article 2(1)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and Article 2(1)(a) of the 1986 
Vienna Convention.
156 Duncan B. Hollis, ‘Defining Treaties’ in Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to 
Treaties (OUP 2012) 12 and Philippe Gautier, ‘Article 1’ and ‘Article 2’ in Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions of the Law of Treaties: a Commentary, v I (OUP 
2011) 45 and 60.
157 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroun v Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Judgment, 2002 ICJ 303, para 263.
158 Hollis (n 156) 26. See also Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between 
Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and admissibility, Judgment, 1994 ICJ 112, paras 23–25.
 reshaping the external dimension of eU police cooperation  29
(1) there must be an intention to create legally binding effects;
(2)  such effects must be governed by international law.159
However, it is more difficult to assess whether particular 
instruments (agreements) fulfil these requirements.160 Accordingly, one 
has to use various evidentiary factors in order to assess the legal nature 
of each particular international instrument. The factors most commonly 
accepted include the wording and substance, as well as the particular 
circumstances (context) surrounding the negotiation and conclusion of 
the instrument.161
Thus, an instrument with an elaborated structure comprising 
articles and covering issues such as the purpose of the instrument, rights 
and obligations of the parties, entry into force, amendment, suspension 
and termination, liability and dispute settlement is likely to constitute 
a treaty. Moreover, binding international agreements normally use 
a certain language featuring ‘shall’ and ‘will’ clauses and a certain 
terminology such as ‘parties’, ‘agree’, ‘agreement’, ‘enter into force’.162 
Additionally, the wider legal framework within which the instrument 
has been enacted, the procedure used, as well as decisions taken 
after the conclusion of the instrument regarding the application of its 
provisions are relevant circumstances for determining its legal nature.163
The factors mentioned above are mere indicators of intent, as 
‘there are no magic words to create a treaty or deny an agreement that 
status’.164 Therefore, the determination of the legal nature of interna-
tional cooperation instruments requires a careful analysis combining 
the above-mentioned factors, by giving consideration to the form, 
terminology and content of the instrument, as well as to the surrounding 
circumstances.165
Things are no different within the European Union. The CJEU 
indicated that the binding character of an agreement should be 
159 See, for more elaborated discussions, Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker, 
International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity (5th revised edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2011) 1121–3, and Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP 2013) 17–18.
160 Hollis (n 156) 26–8.
161 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, paras 
23–25. See also Kirsten Schmalenbach, ‘Article 2. Use of Terms’, in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 
2012), 40–1.
162 Anthony Aust, ‘Alternatives to Treaty-making: MOUs as Political Commitments’, in 
Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (n 156) 48–9.
163 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, para 27.
164 Hollis (n 156) 27.
165 ibid.
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established, in principle, based on the intention of the parties as results 
from the wording of the instrument and the history of negotiations.166 
Moreover, the Commission’s Vademecum on the External Action of the 
European Union stresses the decisive character of the content of an 
instrument for the purpose of determining its legal nature, and warns 
about careful drafting in order to avoid an instrument being considered 
as legally binding.167
Therefore, in order to determine the legal nature of Europol’s 
international cooperation instruments, a complex analysis is required. 
This entails an assessment of Europol’s legal framework pertaining to 
international cooperation, including the procedure for negotiating and 
concluding international cooperation instruments, together with a more 
detailed analysis of the international cooperation instruments.
6. Europol’s international dimension: an assessment
6.1 the legal framework and international cooperation practice 
under council decision 2009/371/Jha
6.1.1  The legal nature of Europol’s cooperation agreements
The analysis of the relevant legal framework, the procedure for the 
negotiation and conclusion, as well as the content and effects support 
the conclusion that Europol’s cooperation agreements can be qualified 
as binding international agreements.168 This is most obvious with 
the operational agreements, which include clear obligations for the 
contracting parties in terms of data protection, information exchange 
and processing, rights for third parties affected, and liability provisions. 
The strategic agreements are lighter in terms of the content of the 
cooperation, but still the procedure used, and the wording and content 
of their provisions, suggest their binding nature. The qualification of 
Europol’s cooperation agreements as binding international agreements 
triggers the application of the principle pacta sunt servanda, and 
international responsibility in case of breach of the duties under the 
agreement.169
166 Case C-327/1991 France v Commission, para 15.
167 Vademecum on the External Action of the European Union (n 131) 52.
168 See also Vara (n 10) 127 and 135.
169 See generally on this issue, Hollis (n 156) 14.
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Europol’s cooperation agreements are to be included in the 
category of international technical–administrative agreements. They 
have a very limited scope, in line with the mandate of the agency, 
and lay down a specific framework for technical and operational 
cooperation. As such, these agreements enable concrete cooperation 
between administrations without touching presumably the political 
sphere of external relations.
6.1.2  The principle of institutional balance and the Meroni doctrine
In the field of police cooperation, Europol is a technical body playing 
a much more modest role than suggested by its name. Europol’s 
discretion to set its international cooperation priorities seems limited 
because of the constraints imposed on the agency in practice by its 
operational and political environment. The restricted role of Europol as 
a global actor was reflected in the agency’s legal framework for inter-
national cooperation,170 and in its cooperation agreements. Europol’s 
agreements primarily cover information exchange and processing, the 
competence of the agency is delineated,171 and essential requirements 
in line with Europol’s legal framework regarding data protection, confi-
dentiality and liaison officers are included.172 Overall, Europol’s legal 
provisions on international cooperation, as well as its agreements and 
related activities were instrumental to attaining the main objectives 
set by the relevant legal framework, including Article 88(2) TFEU, and 
their scope remained within the core mandate of the agency.
Particularly after Lisbon, the conclusion of binding interna-
tional agreements by Europol arguably posed problems for the insti-
tutional balance in the EU external action area.173 Thus, it could be 
maintained that ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements should have been used 
instead or, in the alternative, that the legal framework concerning 
Europol’s cooperation agreements did not account sufficiently for the 
Commission’s role to ensure the Union’s external representation under 
Articles 17(1) TEU and 220 TFEU, and for EP’s prerogatives under 
Article 218 TFEU.
170 See Article 23 of the Europol Council Decision.
171 Still one may argue that Europol’s mandate is broadly defined because of the lack of 
an EU-wide definition of the crimes for which the agency is competent.
172 Note, however, the controversial 2002 Supplemental Agreement between Europol 
and the USA.
173 Ott, Vos and Coman-Kund (n 8) 108.
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Based on the analysis of Europol’s agreements, we take the 
view that these instruments, as technical–administrative agreements 
remaining outside the scope of Article 218 TFEU, do not per se affect 
institutional balance in external relations. In our opinion, the CJEU 
judgment in Case C-363/2014 provides further support for this view 
by validating Europol’s international dimension provided that it was 
ancillary to the core activities of the agency, and that it took place 
within the framework defined by the EU legislator. What is more, the 
Court highlighted the possibility for Europol to conclude cooperation 
agreements as an essential element of this framework, and then 
indicated that the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of these 
instruments provided sufficient safeguards preventing the transfer of 
personal data to third countries from interfering with fundamental 
rights.174 From this it can be inferred that Europol’s cooperation 
agreements, as forms of the agency’s ancillary international action, and 
taking place within the legal framework defined by the legislator, were 
not precluded by Article 218 TFEU.
The legal provisions dealing with international cooperation 
established important formal conditions and controls concerning 
Europol’s cooperation agreements. These included the Council’s ‘list’, 
the role of the Management Board to authorize the negotiation of 
cooperation agreements and to endorse them, the approval of each 
cooperation agreement by the Council, as well as the authoritative 
opinions of the JSB on operational agreements. Insights from practice 
into the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of Europol’s 
agreements revealed additional informal supervisory mechanisms 
carried out by the Commission. Such formal and informal conditions 
and mechanisms appeared to be capable of ensuring consistency 
with the Union’s priorities in external relations, and to preserve the 
Commission’s role under Articles 17 TEU and 220 TFEU. Furthermore, 
the obligation undertaken recently by the Council to consult the EP 
prior to approving Europol’s cooperation agreements, together with the 
duty placed on the chair of the Management Board and of the Director 
to inform the EP on request,175 were presumably sufficient to pass the 
Meroni conditions and the institutional balance test.
174 Case C-363/14 Parliament v Council, paras 53–55. This general finding based on the 
formal legal design of Europol’s procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of cooperation 
agreements could be relativized to some extent when looking at the agency’s international 
cooperation practice, a prime example being the 2002 Supplemental Agreement with 
the USA.
175 Article 48 of the Europol Council Decision.
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Accordingly, Europol’s cooperation agreements are in line overall 
with Meroni and do not seem to disturb the institutional balance in 
EU external relations. Being concluded by an EU body acting on the 
global level, Europol’s agreements are considered as being carried 
out ultimately on behalf of the European Union, which is in contrast 
with the Common Approach on EU agencies, stipulating that EU 
agencies cannot commit the Union to international obligations.176 
Whilst Europol’s international agreements are binding, the agency did 
not have international legal personality because of the strict controls set 
on its international cooperation precluding it from enjoying a sufficient 
degree of autonomy on the international plane.177 Accordingly, since 
Europol is an element of the Union’s institutional structure and the 
Union has international legal personality, it follows that the obligations 
arising from Europol’s cooperation agreements are incumbent in the 
end upon the EU.
6.2 the new europol regulation
The legal framework established by the new Regulation arguably 
marks a weakening of Europol’s role in international cooperation, 
in parallel with a partial enhancement of controlling mechanisms 
over the agency’s international dimension. While emphasizing almost 
identically with the old Europol Council Decision the instrumental–
ancillary nature of Europol’s international cooperation,178 the new 
Regulation also subdues the agency’s core international activities – i.e. 
exchange of personal data – to ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements and the 
Commission’s ‘adequacy decisions’. The agency is merely left with the 
possibility to conclude administrative arrangements with a view to 
implementing the instruments providing the legal basis for interna-
tional cooperation, or to conclude, on the matters covered previously 
by strategic agreements, working arrangements which are, however, 
qualified as non-binding for the EU and the Member States. At the 
same time, the new Regulation features increased scrutiny from the 
176 Para 25. This statement seems to envisage two possible scenarios: (1) that EU 
agencies cannot adopt legally binding international cooperation instruments or (2) that 
EU agencies could adopt legally binding international cooperation instruments but without 
engaging the Union internationally; the latter scenario would entail that EU agencies 
have their own international legal personality allowing them to take up in their own right 
obligations on the international plane.
177 On the international legal personality of EU agencies and, in particular, of Europol, 
see also Coman-Kund (n 11) 105–6 and 117.
178 Article 23(1) of Regulation 2016/794.
34 eUrope and the World
Commission and the EP over Europol’s international cooperation. As 
discussed, for the Commission this entails the possibility to assess 
Europol’s ‘surviving’ cooperation agreements, getting involved in 
the agency’s annual and multiannual planning, and undertaking the 
periodic evaluation of the agency. EP’s increased role vis-à-vis the 
agency materializes most importantly in the monitoring of Europol’s 
activities through the JPSG and the possibility to obtain access to 
Europol information. The previous points suggest that Europol’s 
redesigned international dimension is likely to respect institutional 
balance in external relations and the Meroni doctrine.
However, the new legal framework also raises some legal 
and practical problems. First, the application of the criteria for 
binding  international agreements discussed under section 5.2 to 
Europol’s working and administrative arrangements which will be 
concluded under the new Regulation might conduce to the conclusion 
that some of them are legally binding instruments.179 In spite of 
being labelled ‘arrangements’ and acting essentially as implementing 
tools, if the wording and content of these instruments as well 
as the particular circumstances surrounding their negotiation and 
conclusion reveal the intention of the parties to create legally binding 
effects under international law they will qualify as binding interna-
tional agreements. Just like under Europol’s former legal framework, 
this would entail that such specific technical–administrative agreements 
would ultimately bind the EU. Hence, replacing Europol’s previous 
strategic and operational agreements with working and administra-
tive arrangements does not necessarily result in a complete abolition 
of the agency’s ‘problematic’ power to enact binding international 
cooperation instruments. What is more, Europol’s new international 
cooperation instruments can be seen as problematic because there is 
more uncertainty as to their legal nature, which might impede legal 
review and individual protection.
Second, the fact that the new Regulation is elliptical as regards 
the involvement of the Council, the Commission and the EP in the 
procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of Europol’s working 
and administrative arrangements raises questions about the sufficiency 
of controlling mechanisms by the main EU institutions in light of 
the Meroni doctrine.180 From this perspective, the new Regulation 
179 Presumably, this could be the case most obviously for the administrative arrangements 
concluded by Europol for enabling exchanges of personal data.
180 Coman-Kund (n 11) 116–17.
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marks a step back as compared to the strict system of controls 
regarding Europol’s cooperation agreements under the previous legal 
framework, featuring Council’s approval, the influential opinions of 
the JSB, and, lately, also the duty to consult the EP. While Europol’s 
international cooperation instruments will be concluded within the 
framework of existing international agreements or the Commission’s 
‘adequacy decisions’, the lack of express provisions on controlling 
mechanisms ensuring that the agency’s arrangements remain within 
its mandate and do not affect the powers of the institutions in the EU 
external action area is a matter of concern. Arguably this concern is 
not sufficiently addressed by the Commission’s involvement in the 
agency’s annual and multiannual planning nor by the duties to provide 
access to information to the EP or to transmit ex post to the JPSG the 
administrative agreements concluded with third countries and inter-
national organizations.181 According to Articles 17(1) TEU and 220 
TFEU, and in line with the Common Approach on EU agencies, at least 
involvement and oversight by the Commission should be ensured in 
line with the role of the latter to ensure the Union’s external repre-
sentation and consistency of EU policy. Moreover, similarly to the JSB 
under the Europol Council Decision, the EDPS could be granted an 
advisory role in the procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of 
Europol’s administrative arrangements with third country authorities 
and international organizations.
7. Conclusion
The analysis of Europol’s international cooperation framework and 
practice reveals an agency with an international dimension ancillary 
to its core tasks, and which was subject to various formal and informal 
conditions and controls, in particular by the Council, the Commission 
and the Member States. As such, Europol’s international dimension 
represents a specific form of EU administrative external action which 
respects in principle the institutional balance in external relations and 
with the present-day Meroni requirements. This holds also for Europol’s 
cooperation agreements having a limited scope which revolves around 
181 In our view more effective oversight would have been ensured by including in 
the Europol regulation a duty to inform the JPSG before an administrative agreement is 
concluded (ex ante) as this could prevent potential breaches of the relevant legal framework 
from taking place in the first place.
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the agency’s information-related tasks, and laying down a very specific 
framework for technical and operational cooperation. As a specific 
category of international agreements of a technical–administrative 
nature, these instruments appear to remain outside the scope of 
Article 218 TFEU, and they comply overall with the relevant EU legal 
framework. Contrary to the Common Approach on EU agencies, 
Europol’s cooperation agreements ultimately bind the Union under 
international law.
Regulation 2016/794 substantially redesigns Europol’s inter-
national dimension while ensuring that the agency’s cooperation 
agreements remain valid bases for international cooperation under the 
new legal framework. The new Europol Regulation brings Europol’s 
international dimension in line with that of other EU agencies, and 
attempts to improve the agency’s accountability for its international 
activities through strengthening the Commission’s position towards the 
agency, increasing parliamentary oversight, and establishing supervision 
by the EDPS. Quite significantly, the new Regulation removes the 
agency’s power to conclude cooperation agreements by replacing them 
with ‘Article 218 TFEU’ agreements. While in our view such a change 
was not imperative in order to ensure the compatibility of Europol’s 
international dimension with the current Treaty framework, it arguably 
downplays the role of Europol on the international plane. This suggests 
a more modest role for Europol in international cooperation, which will 
likely respect institutional balance in external relations and the Meroni 
conditions. The application of the new Regulation also raises interesting 
legal and practical problems, such as: finding the most appropriate 
type of international agreement under Article 218 TFEU in order to 
address Europol’s operational needs; determining the legal nature and 
implications of Europol’s working and administrative arrangements; 
or the issue of supervision and controls over Europol’s international 
cooperation powers and instruments. Future practice in the application 
of the new Europol Regulation will offer more insights into the actual 
shaping of the agency’s international dimension and the way in which 
these issues are addressed.
In brief, this article has shown that Europol’s international 
dimension under the former legal framework was compatible overall 
with the EU constitutional framework and, therefore, a reform of this 
aspect of the agency’s operations was not indispensable from a legal 
point of view. It also argues that the new Europol Regulation does not 
seem to address ideally some of the important aspects of the agency’s 
international cooperation. From a broader perspective, however, the 
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reform of Europol’s international dimension may signal a more general 
phenomenon of enhancing the Union’s international actorness182 by 
streamlining the rather fragmented EU external action institutional 
landscape, and by instating coordination and control over various EU 
bodies pursuing international cooperation.
182 See, on the concept and application of Union’s international actorness, Martijn 
Groenleer and Louise van Schaik, ‘United We Stand? The European Union’s International 
Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’ (2007) 
45 JCMS 969.
